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YOU'VE GOT YOUR MOTHER'S LAUGH: WHAT BANKRUPTCY
MEDIATION CAN LEARN FROM THE HER/HISTORY OF DIVORCE
AND CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION
NANCY A. WELSH*
Due to our current deep economic woes, growing bankruptcy filings, and
apparent legislative unwillingness to expand the number of judges, bankruptcy
courts are exploring the use of mediation to help resolve adversary proceedings,
negotiate elements of reorganizations, and deal with claims that cannot be heard
directly in bankruptcy proceedings.1 There is relatively recent precedent for these
uses of mediation.2 In addition, mediation advocates have been consistent in urging
greater use of the process 3 to reduce debtors' and claimants' costs, 4 bridge the
* Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law. I am deeply indebted to Kelly Towns,
Christopher Demetriou and Carolina Aguilar for their assistance with the substantial research that was
required for this Article. My deep thanks as well to Peter Alexander, Margaret Whiteman Greecher,
Christopher Honeyman, Nancy LaMont, and Peter Salem for comments on previous drafts, to fellow panel
members, Hon. Elizabeth Stong, Ralph Peeples and William Woodward, for very helpful observations and
inquiries before, during and after our presentations at the symposium, and to Paul Kirgis and Elayne
Greenberg at St. John's University School of Law for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1 See In re Kent, No. 07-3238, 2008 WL 5047821, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July, 25 2008) (showing parties'
eventual willingness to agree "to utilize the [c]ourt's mediation program"); In re Teraforce Tech. Corp., 347
B.R. 838, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (noting successful result from court-ordered mediation); cf In re
American Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing alternative dispute
resolution option termed "Court Approved Distribution Procedures" allowing asbestos claim holders to enter
mediation instead of litigating their claims in court). Mediation also is being used to a lesser degree for
preference cases and bankruptcy appeals. See William J. Woodward, Jr., The Third Way: Mediation of
Products Claims in the Piper Aircraft Trust, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 477 (2009) (discussing
reasons for "inevitably-lower rate of consensual settlement" among preference cases).
2 See H. Slayton Dabney Jr. & Dion W. Hayes, Bankruptcy Lawyers Better Tune Up Their ADR Skills: Best
Products Is One Case Where Mediation Really Worked, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (June 2009)
(outlining use of mediation in Best Products liquidation following company's second chapter 11 filing and
noting "failure of a claimant to participate in the mediation resulted in the disallowance and extinguishment
of its claim"); Ralph R. Mabey et al., Expanding the Reach ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy:
The Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of Mediation and the Other Forms ofADR, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1259,
1278-83 (1995) (describing court-connected bankruptcy mediation programs); Carolyn M. Penna, The
Greyhound ADR Program, 204 N.Y. L.J. 114, 3 col. 1 (1990) (describing Greyhound bankruptcy and ADR
program); see also General Order, Re: Procedures in Adversary Proceedings, 320 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Del.
2005) (providing for mandatory mediation). There has also been experimentation with the use of mediation
to resolve appeals of bankruptcy decisions. See, e.g., Order in In Re: Procedures to Govern Mediation of
Appeals from the United States Bankruptcy Court for this District, U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware (2004) (noting mediation of all appeals before Court as mandatory).
3 See Mabey et al., supra note 2, at 1308-12 (urging greater use of mediation by bankruptcy courts).
4 See, e.g., Dabney and Hayes, supra note 2, at 16 (acknowledging mediation helped unsecured creditors
to receive nearly 96 cents for each dollar owed in liquidation); Penna, supra note 2, 3 col. I ("In a
bankruptcy setting, the objective is to operate the debtor company at the lowest rates possible, in order to
satisfy all creditors. Usually this means less left over for the creditor. A strong interest arises in the company
finding an economical way of dealing with such obligations as damage claims.").
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jurisdictional and standing challenges that bankruptcies can pose,5 and offer
claimants the opportunity to be heard and determine their own resolution of claims.
6
At this point, though, relatively few judicial opinions discuss bankruptcy
mediation or its impact. Not surprisingly, the few cases available demonstrate that
bankruptcy courts generally favor the use of mediation to resolve claims and help
with reorganizations.7 What is surprising, however, are the cases in which parties
have attempted to use mediation to achieve unexpected and inappropriate results
8
and those in which bankruptcy judges, parties and/or their lawyers apparently
expect mediators to do much more than facilitate the parties' communication,
negotiation and resolution. 9 Sometimes, for example, judicial opinions reveal an
assumption that mediators will make both procedural and substantive decisions, and
that in reviewing these decisions, judges should grant substantial deference to the
mediators.'l Cases such as these may suggest that the repeat players within
bankruptcy-judges, lawyers, accountants, and creditorsll'-do not necessarily
understand how the role of the mediator is supposed to diverge in significant ways
from the "traditional neutral" roles of trustee, special master, magistrate, arbitrator,
examiner or judge. An appropriate response would appear to be education of the
repeat players involved in bankruptcies.
On the other hand, these few cases also may signal that mediation will not
always be the most appropriate vehicle for resolving issues within, or related to,
bankruptcy. Instead, it may be that bankruptcy courts should both incorporate
See Dabney and Hayes, supra note 2, at 17 ("As to personal injury and products liability claims
specifically, which the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to liquidate, the debtor was able to avoid
protracted discovery and litigation in non-bankruptcy courts that would have severely delayed the
distribution in the Best case."); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) ("[L]itigation offers an answer to ... questions [regarding standing
and joinder of claims and parties] that is legally correct, but contextually dangerous, as it excludes
legitimately interested people. One of settlement's contributions is that it can ask, 'Who should be at the
table?' and offer a more inclusive answer than litigation. When that occurs and a more comprehensive
settlement ensues, litigation is improved because it can proceed with cases in which the risk of de facto
exclusion is less serious.").
6 See Dabney and Hayes, supra note 2, at 16 (explaining how non-repeat claimants such as "customers,
personal injury or products liability claimants, and landlords" appreciated the "fuller hearing" available
through mediation, as well as the opportunity to participate in producing an outcome).
7 In re American Capital Equip., 405 BR. 415, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (calling alternative dispute
resolution "indisputably procedurally much more favorable" to court litigation).
8 See infra pp. 443-44 and note 102.
9 See infra p. 444 and note 144.
10 See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 176 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (explaining deference given
to mediator and "no reason to question [his] judgment" because he had basis for decisions); Hickox v.
Frieland (In re HBLS, L.P.), 01 Civ. 2025, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19112 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2001) (applying
manifest disregard standard when reviewing mediator determination).
11 See Eric M. Van Horn et al., Restructuring the Misperceptions of Lawyers: Another Task for Bankruptcy
Professionals, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 91 (Sept. 2009) ("Bona-fide bankruptcy practitioners are aware
that we are repeat players."). States and state agencies also play the role of creditors. See Ralph Brubaker,
Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a
Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 95, 98 (2007) ("[S]tates and state agencies ... end up
as creditors in lots of[] ways .... ").
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mediation in appropriate cases and consider expanding the availability or functions
of "traditional neutrals." In the bankruptcy context, that might mean experimenting
with the use of trustees and examiners in innovative procedures that include, as one
part of the procedures, facilitation of dialogue and consensual resolution.1
2
Importantly, bankruptcy courts would need to ensure that both trustees and
examiners receive training in facilitation skills and procedures that will help them
manage this new function appropriately and achieve both procedural and
substantive justice.
Though divorce and child custody matters may seem far-removed from
bankruptcy proceedings, liquidations and reorganizations bear some intriguing
superficial similarities to divorces and ongoing custody and support arrangements
(perhaps better termed "familial reorganizations" for purposes of this Article). In
addition, an examination of the use, abuse and evolution of mediation in this area of
practice may prove useful for those who are now introducing mediation into
bankruptcy. The story of divorce and child custody mediation, like most growing-
up stories, follows a trajectory of rejection of the status quo, successful
experimentation with alternatives, enthusiastic over-promising, overuse and
consequent struggles or breakdown, disappointment, reluctant recognition of limits,
and finally acceptance of the need for realistic retrenchment and more restrained
growth. As in the bankruptcy context, the use of certain "traditional neutrals"-
e.g., custody investigators, referees, conciliators-has been curtailed in many
jurisdictions as the judiciary developed a preference for the consensual and flexible
process of mediation. 3 Recently, however, some commentators have begun to urge
a closer look at the reality of today's court-connected divorce and child custody
mediation programs.14 These commentators have begun advocating for a more
limited use of mediation, in part due to the emergence of new, hybrid dispute
resolution models that confound any bright line distinction between consensual and
adjudicative approaches. 15 Is it possible that bankruptcy courts, repeat players
within the system and their clients could skip a couple of the stages that were
involved in the evolution of divorce and child custody mediation? Only if there is
12 See infra pp. 459-61.
13 See Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court Is in Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected
Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 377, 424-25 (2006) ("There is no question that many judges
perceive mediation as a dispute resolution process in which clients are given the opportunity to be active
participants in negotiated solutions, and that these solutions may be better and more durable than those
reached in the litigation process without mediation.").
14 See Janet A. Johnson, Symposium on the Miller Commission on Matrimonial Law, 27 PACE L. REV. 539,
542-44 (2006) (explaining commentators urge closer examination of child custody proceedings because
lawyers may advocate for their goal rather than child's ultimate desire); John Lande, The Movement Toward
Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 81, 94-95
(2008) (stating examination of interests and needs of parties necessary to determine if litigation or dispute
resolution better suits parties); Peter Salem et al., Triaging Family Court Services: The Connecticut Judicial
Branch's Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE. L. REV. 741, 747-48 (2006) (positing increased demand for
mediators in custody disputes results in "difficult" and "frustrating" cases).
15 Lande, supra note 14, at 97-98 (explaining how "mediation-evaluation hybrid process[]" creates
positive results).
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willingness to consider the lessons of others' history (or as this Article's title
suggests, "her/history"). In this Article, I will articulate my understanding of the
unfolding stories 16 of mediation in various parts of the civil litigation system and
suggest what these stories may teach.
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDIATION INTO THE COURTS
In recent years, many have written their own narratives of the story of
mediation in the United States. 17 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to begin
by noting that mediation-a process in which a third party called a 'mediator' assists
disputing parties to reach their own, consensual resolution of their dispute-has
existed in the United States for a very long time. Colonists 18 and Quakers 9 used a
mediation process to resolve disputes. Following a period of tremendous social
unrest in the late 1800s and early 1900s-as the U.S. reconceived itself after the
Civil War, morphed from a pastoral to an industrial power, and experienced
disruptive and sometimes-violent labor disputes as displaced citizens and waves of
immigrants dealt with major economic change and deep cultural, class and wage
differences-commentators again urged the use of mediation.20 Though the process
16 See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Court, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is
Re-Shaping Out Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 185-88 (2003) (detailing civil litigation's trend
towards mediation and positive perceptions of mediation process).
17 See, e.g., id at 167-68 (providing personal perspective on evolution of alternative dispute resolution in
legal world); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders ofADR,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2, 5 (2000) (examining early contributions of social theorists and
empiricists as "'intellectual' founders of 'ADR'); Douglas Yarn, The Death ofADR: A Cautionary Tale of
Isomorphism Through Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 930-31 (2004) (discussing historic
evolution of dispute resolution in England and analogizing it to institutionalizing alternative dispute
resolution in American courts); see also JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-31
(2d ed. 2006); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning ision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation:
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, The
Thinning Vision] (examining role of self-determination in alternative dispute resolution as it adapts to court
culture).
18 See Hensler, supra note 16, at 168-70 (recognizing Puritan settlers in New England and other utopian
societies desired to avoid adversarial process).
" See JANE CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN DICKINSON
(2009); WILLIAM OFFUTT, OF "GOOD LAWS" AND "GOOD MEN": LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE DELAWARE
VALLEY, 1680-1710 146 (1995) (discussing Quaker "Gospel Order" dispute resolution system that put
disputes in hands of small groups of community members to keep decisions away from outsiders).
2°See Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in MARY PARKER FOLLETF, PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT:
A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920S 69, 71 (Pauline Graham ed., Harvard Business School
Press) (1995) (The best way to use conflict resolution in a constructive way is the concept of integration.
Neither domination, in which one party wins the conflict; nor compromise, in which both parties sacrifice
something toward resolution, are not the best way to make conflict work in favor of the parties. Integration is
a way in which the desires of the each party can find a place and neither side has to sacrifice. Instead of
dealing with what already exists, integration creates something new.); Lan Q. Hang, Online Dispute
Resolution Systems: The Future of Cyberspace Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 841 (2001) ("ADR has
been around since 1920. Its purpose is 'to avoid the costs, delays, and risks of a litigation system
unresponsive to the needs of the busy industrial age."' (citing Past, Present & Future: Building on 70 Years
of Innovation - The AAA Looks to the 21st Century, 51 DISP. RESOL. J. 109, 110 (1996))); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 17, at 7-10 (writing about Mary Parker Follett, she wrote: "The mother of invention saw clearly
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was rejected in some areas,21 the U.S. Congress ultimately chose to make mediation
and arbitration central to the resolution of labor disputes.22
Then, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during another period of social
transformation23 and heightened distrust of authority,24 advocates began calling for
the use of mediation to resolve community and family disputes. In 1976, judges,
lawyers, and others gathered for the Pound Conference 25 where Harvard Professor
Frank Sander delivered a speech that is now remembered primarily for its advocacy
of a "multi-door courthouse, 26 that would include mediation. By the late 1980s,
largely in response to crushing dockets, courts were beginning to adopt mediation to
resolve small claims, family, and non-family civil cases.27
Today, less than twenty years later, mediation is an integral part of the civil
litigation process in the United States.28 State, federal, and administrative courts
in the 1920s that there were better ways to make use of conflict - to embrace it and to use it for more
creative and innovative solutions .... ").
21 See Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European
Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 423, 442 (2009) (explaining how well established European tradition of conciliation courts
was rejected in United States because of the concern "that these courts encouraged a discretionary exercise
of authority that would reinforce power differentials and subvert the rule of law").
22 29 U.S.C. § 51 (2006) (In 1913 Congress enacted legislation to facilitate mediation in labor disputes. In
1966, section 51 was repealed. By that time the National Labor Relations Act had enacted the Conciliation of
Labor Disputes (1947) which states "the settlement of issues between employers and employees through
collective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for
conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employers and the representatives of
their employees to reach and maintain agreements .... (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 171 (2006))).
23 For example, this period included the rise of the feminist movement and the advent of no fault divorce.
See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 561, 563
(1988) (noting trends in liberalization during 60's and 70's in context of feminism and important shift to no
fault divorce).
24 See Orlando Patterson, Liberty Against the Democratic State: on the Historical and Contemporary
Sources of American Distrust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 151, 182-184 (Mark E. Warren, ed., 1999)
(providing data showing generational differences in levels of distrust).
25 Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the
Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 401 (2004-2005) (In 1906, Dean
Roscoe Pound gave a speech in St. Paul, Minnesota entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice." Pound suggested a wide-ranging course of court reforms. His suggestions,
however, were not embraced by American Bar Association. In 1975, Chief Justice Warren Burger began a
new push to finish what Pound had started. The resulting conference, jointly sponsored by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Judges, and the American Bar Association, focused
on Pound's 1906 speech. To prepare for the challenges of the 21st century, the judges, lawyers and academics
assembled in St. Paul offered bold ideas for change to address the problems of justice being faced by the
courts.).
26 Id. at 402 (Professor Sander used the term "multi-door courthouse" to suggest a variety of dispute
resolution techniques that could be fit to the needs of the dispute.); Moffitt, supra note 5 (The phrase first
"appeared as a companion to a graphic on the cover of a magazine reporting on the Pound Conference.")
(citing Michael L. Moffitt, Before the Big Bang: The Making of an ADR Pioneer, 22 NEGOT. J. 437, 437-38
(2006)).
27 Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 17, at 20-23 (discussing courts' reasons for embracing
mediation).
28 See Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 487, 489 (Michael L. Moffit & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
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rely on mediation to resolve cases.29 Similarly, state and federal agencies regularly
use the process. 30 Lawyers who were first introduced to the process in mandatory
court-connected mediation programs now counsel its use on a private, voluntary
basis.
31
II. THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF MEDIATION
But what exactly is this process called "mediation?" The Uniform Mediation
Act, adopted at this point by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration
Association, as well as ten states,32 defines mediation as "a process in which a
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them
in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute."33 The Model Standards
of Conduct for Mediators describe it as "a process in which an impartial third party
facilitates communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary decision making
by the parties to the dispute. 34 According to the Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation, mediation is "a process in which a mediator, an
impartial third party, facilitates the resolution of family disputes by promoting the
participants' voluntary agreement. 3 5 These definitions suggest the following
common characteristics: a third party; communication and negotiation between the
parties; and voluntary decision-making or agreement.36
9 See, e.g., EARNESTINE RESHARD, FLORIDA MEDIATION & ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM
24, 30-31, 46-47, 64-65 (19th ed., Fiscal Year 2005-2006) (2007) (reporting Florida's use of mediation in
2005-2006 fiscal year).
30 See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2008 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 8 (2008) (The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that in
2007, in the Federal Sector Mediation Program, agencies reported "that there were 37,809 instances of pre-
complaint EEO counseling across the federal government. Of that number, the parties participated in ADR in
18,262 cases, or 48.3% of the time.").
31 See Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an ADR "Confer and
Report" Rule, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253, 263-64 (examining effects of rule requiring lawyers to use ADR
processes and report results to court).
32 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT REFERENCES & ANNOTATIONS (amended 2003), 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 91 (2006 &
Sulp. 2009) (noting mediation has become integral part of dispute resolution processes).
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (amended 2003) 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 105 (defining term "mediation").
34 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS. pmbl. (2005).
35 MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Overview and Definitions
(2000); see Andrew Schepard, An Introduction to the Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce
Mediation, 35 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (2001).
36 Also sometimes referenced as "self-determination." See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS, Standard I (positing mediation is based on self-determination, requiring voluntary decisions);
Tim Hedeen, Ensuring Self-Determination Through Mediation Readiness: Ethical Considerations (July
2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/hedeenTI.cfn (discussing mediator's responsibility to ensure
participation between parties); see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A
Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 777, 781 (1999)
(principle of informed consent helps to "promote" self-determination and empowers parties to gain control
over the outcome); Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 17 at 39 (explaining mediators are responsible for
assisting parties reach voluntary decision).
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In practice, mediation takes many different forms. It can be facilitative,
37
elicitive,38 focused on developing mutual understanding,39 therapeutic,4 ° or
transformative, 41 among other possibilities. Though there are differences among
them, these models share a focus on drawing out the disputing parties,
understanding their values and underlying interests, helping them to communicate
fully, respectfully and productively with each other, and fostering their ability to
develop their own, customized solutions.42
37 See Barnand Mayer, Facilative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 29 (Jay Folberg, et. al eds., 2004) (discussing mediation as facilitative
process); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for
the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin, Understanding Mediators]
(discussing mediation in facilitative form where mediator clarifies and enhances communications between
parties in order to help them come to decision).
38 See Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) [hereinafter Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation]
(explaining mediation can be performed in elicitive fashion).
3 See GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIATION THROUGH
UNDERSTANDING (2009).
40 See Marsha Kline Pruett & Janet R. Johnston, Therapeutic Mediation with High-Conflict Parents:
Effective Models and Strategies, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND
APPLICATIONS 95 (Jay Folberg, et. al eds., 2004) (suggesting mediators use therapeutic methods of
counseling); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7, 12, 19
(1986) (suggesting mediation process is similar to therapeutic event); see also CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE,
THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 41 (2d ed. 1996) (describing
other categories such as "social network mediators," "authoritative mediators," and "independent
mediators"-categories that have more to do with relationship between mediator and disputants than
particular types of interventions that they tend to use).
41 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 46, 217-18 (Rev. ed. 2005) (describing transformative theory as
based on notion people perceive conflict as interactional crisis and role of transformative-oriented mediator
as assisting parties in overcoming their crisis by allowing parties to define mediation process and
encouraging fully-informed voluntary resolution, rather than forcing settlement); Robert A. Baruch Bush &
Sally Ganong Pope, Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of
Transformative Mediation, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 77 (2002) ("In the transformative mediation
process, parties can recapture their sense of competence and connection, reverse the negative conflict cycle,
re-establish a constructive (or at least neutral) interaction and move forward on a positive footing, with the
mediator's help."); Joseph Folger, Harmony and Transformative Mediation Practice: Sustaining Ideological
Differences in Purpose and Practice, 84 N.D. L. REV. 825, 844-48 (2008) (articulating four types of
transformative mediation techniques that "characterize the essential elements of transformative
interventions": allowing parties to control process, mediator's maintenance of non-directive role,
encouraging parties' expression and examination of differences, and supporting parties' transformations
toward enlightenment and self-empowerment); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative
Mediation in the USPS Redress Program: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J.
399, 401-02 (2001) (examining transformative mediation in employment setting as viable alternative to
traditional adversarial-based process and as vehicle for parties to seize greater control over their own
conflicts and learn how to effectively manage future conflicts).
42 See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: The "Problem" in Court-Oriented
Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 869 (2008) (discussing power of mediation to facilitate respectful
and productive cooperation among parties, enable parties' to concentrate on their fundamental needs and
interests, provide an adaptable process customized to best accommodate parties' circumstances, and foster
development of creative resolution); Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 17, at 17-19 (2001) (elucidating
core mediation principle of self-determination and importance of active party participation in shaping
mediation process and outcome and highlighting mediator's role as "foster[ing] an environment that would
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On the other hand, this process called 'mediation' can also be implemented in a
manner that is evaluative,43 directive,44 and focused on bargaining.45 These models
present a rather different picture, in which the mediator plays the central role,
hopefully beginning by listening to the disputing parties but quickly shifting the
focus to the provision of advice to the parties and their lawyers, to help them be
realistic regarding their options (usually in civil litigation or administrative
adjudication) and to guide them toward a resolution consistent with those options.
46
The available research suggests that the most effective mediations (and
mediators) are likely to combine elements of all of these models. 47 A wealth of
research and theory also affirms the importance of providing a mediation process
enable the parties' individual and joint will to emerge").
43 See L. Randolph Lowry, Evaluative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPILICATIONS 72 (Jay Folberg, et al. eds., 2004); Riskin, Understanding Mediators,
supra note 37, at 44-45 (noting although evaluative approach may make it easier for parties to reach
resolution because evaluative mediator provides recommendations and assessments, thereby removing some
of parties' decision-making burdens, mediators' evaluations may impede parties' ability to appreciate their
own and each other's positions and make the process more antagonistic).
44 See Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 38, at 30 (defining term directive as "almost any
conduct by which the mediator directs the mediation process, or the participants, toward a particular
procedure or perspective or outcome").
45 See Silbey & Merry, supra note 40, at 19-20 (describing bargaining style mediation as rigid process
driven by mediators who "claim authority as professionals with expertise in process, law, and the court
system" and blatantly control proceedings, "ignoring emotional demands and concentrating on demands that
can be traded off," often preferring caucuses over direct party communication and advising parties of "the
benefits of a settlement of any kind").
46 See Debra Lewis & Nancy A. Welsh, Adaptations to the Civil Mediation Model: Suggestions from
Research into the Approaches to Conflict Resolution Used in the Twin Cities' Cambodian Community, 15
MEDIATION Q. 345, 354 (1998) (revealing preference of sampled ethnic group for mediators who implement
evaluative, rather than facilitative methods); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 865-66 (discussing "court-
oriented" mediation in civil litigation contexts where mediators and other 'repeat players' focus narrowly on
likely outcome of litigation and what each party is willing to pay to avoid costs and risks of litigation, and
employ mediation procedures most likely to lead to settlement, often excluding consideration of parties'
motivations); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do with
It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 846 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Making Deals] ("Court-connected mediation...
often involves evaluative interventions by the mediator . . . . [M]ediators regularly provide disputants with
'reality-checks' by critically assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the disputants' cases and even opining
regarding appropriate settlement ranges."); Welsh, The Thinning Vision supra note 17, at 4, 47-48 (noting
court-institutionalized mediation has departed from previously dominant view, which "assumed that the
disputing parties would be the principal actors and creators within the mediation process" and has become a
process dominated by mediators who employ evaluative methods, such as persuading parties to accept
settlement and assessing strengths and weaknesses of parties' positions, often in private caucuses).
47 See Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 38, at 17 (reporting that same mediator was
selected as best facilitative mediator and second-best evaluative mediator); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42,
at 868-69 (describing positive impact of various mediation theories); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back
through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and
Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 573, 671 (2004) (suggesting insignificance of "rigid distinctions"
among mediation frameworks and positing that "'quality' mediation" demands the use all appropriate
methods "that serve procedural justice and resolution rather than development of niches for mediators with
different 'orientations'); see also ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF MEDIATION, FINAL REPORT: Apr. 2006-Feb. 2008, at 12-13, 17 (2008) (recommending best
practice for mediators is to tailor mediation process to each particular case rather than using the same
identical approach and suggesting "techniques sometimes could be used more wisely and prudently").
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that the parties will perceive as fair 48-also described as one that offers the parties
"an experience of justice. " 49 To achieve this experience, the parties need: the
opportunity to be fully heard; to know that what they have said has been considered
(ideally, by both the mediator and the other party50); and to feel treated in an even-
handed and respectful manner (again, ideally, by both the mediator and the other
party). 51 All of these procedural characteristics are consistent with the idea of
drawing out the parties and affirming their centrality to the dispute and its
resolution. Importantly, they also are not inconsistent with a process that involves
the mediator ultimately playing a central role in educating and guiding the parties
toward resolution.52
48 Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE
FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 165, 171 (Andrea Kupfer-Scheider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness] (noting research has confirmed link between perceptions
of process fairness in negotiation and negotiators' perceptions of fairness of proposed outcomes). In addition
to the relationship of the parties to the third-party mediator, the relationship between the parties involved in
the mediation and the negotiators themselves is also important. Negotiators' relative status in the group helps
to determine the impact of procedural fairness on their attitudes and behaviors. In a negotiation between two
individuals that perceive themselves to be of uneven status, the lower status negotiator will likely be more
satisfied with the outcome if she perceives she has been treated in a procedurally just manner by the higher
status negotiator. On the other hand, the higher status negotiator will perceive the process to be fair only if
there is a favorable outcome. Id. at 171; Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 818 ("Disputants who
believe that they have been treated in a procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude that the
resulting outcome is substantively fair."). Researchers have found that procedural justice matters. Disputants'
perceptions of the justice provided by a procedure affect their judgments of the distributive justice provided
by the outcome, their compliance with that outcome, and their faith in the legitimacy of the institution that
offered the procedure. Disputants use the following indicia to assess procedural justice: whether the
procedure provided them with the opportunity to tell their stories; whether the third party considered their
stories; and whether the third party treated them in an even-handed and dignified manner. Id. at 817; see
Yuval Feldman & Tom Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and Possible Pitfalls of Mandating
Procedural Justice in the Workplace 25-26 (Sept. 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l133521) (examining concept of procedural justice in company management
decisions and concluding employees' behavior is positively impacted when they view their employers'
methods for promotional and pay increase evaluations as fair).
49 See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 791-92 (describing expectation disputants have regarding
mediation process and its affect on their perception and compliance with outcome of dispute resolution
process).
50 See Lisa Bingham & Tina Nabatchi, Address at the International Conflict Management Association 2006
Conference: The Determinants of Outcomes in Transformative Mediation (June 27, 2006) (discussing
importance of being heard by other disputant).
I Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why
We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 575 (2008) (noting
people will still be satisfied with unfavorable results if they perceived the process to be a fair); see
FRIEDMAN & HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 39; TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION:
LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 174 (2009) (positing disputants feel they
have been treated justly and fairly when mediators give due consideration to their perspectives); Welsh,
Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 48, at 170 ("[P]eople who believe that they have been treated in a
procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude that the resulting outcome is substantively fair, even if
that outcome is unfavorable."); Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 823-24 (noting fair treatment will
lead disputant to feel procedural justice was served regardless of unfavorable outcome); Welsh, Stepping
Back, supra note 47, at 623 (indicating perception of mediation process enhances dignity of manner in which
parties conduct themselves).
52 See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 805-06 (positing attorneys prefer mediators who play more
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So which model of mediation is best? Which model should be institutionalized
in the courts, particularly courts with mandatory mediation programs? Battles have
been fought over these questions53 and research has been done,54 fueled at least in
part by the hunger for legitimacy and access to the remunerative 55 business of
mediation.
The answers to these questions depend, of course, on the goals of the mediation
process. If the aim of mediation is to enhance the parties' ability to communicate
and negotiate directly with each other-which may be particularly important when
there will be an ongoing relationship 56 and a need to collaborate in the
implementation of any agreement-it appears important for the process to foster
parties' ability to engage in "mutual consideration. 5 7 In other words, the parties
active role by commenting on parties' argument strength and outlining settlement ranges); Welsh, Stepping
Back, supra note 47, at 576 (identifying "transformative" interventions as process of "enhancing disputants'
communication and mutual understanding to enable the disputants to find their own way to a settlement"
through their own empowerment).
53 Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 17, at 27-29 (citing to many articles written about debates over
superiority of facilitative, evaluative and transformative mediation); Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 47, at
576 (noting continuing debate exists regarding level of involvement mediators should have in mediation
process).
54 Tina Nabatchi et al., Evaluating Transformative Mediation in Practice: The Premises, Principles, and
Behaviors of USPS Mediators I (July 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-916008) (evaluating transformative mediation program used by Unites States Postal
Service.); see Shestowsky, supra note 51, at 572 (2008) (positing method should be adopted that aligns with
disputants' mediation preferences) (citing Roselle Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical
Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 570
(1997) [hereinafter Wissler, Effects of Mandatory Mediation]); see also Dorothy J. Della Noce et al.,
Signposts and Crossroads: A Model For Live Action Mediator Assessment, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
197, 206-07 (2008) (discussing transformative mediation as function of mediator's understanding of her
supporting role in parties' efforts to resolve conflict); Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 47, at 580
(evaluating various models in context of school education mediation and relating it to broader field of
mediation).
55 The level of remuneration, however, can vary dramatically. See Andrew K. Niebler, Getting the Most
Out of Mediation: Toward a Theory of Optimal Compensation for Mediators, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167,
172-73 (1999) (explaining amount of mediator compensation depends on whether mediator is paid on
uniform hourly fee or variable hourly fee and duration of mediation).
56 See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 25, at 403 (discussing Frank Sander's description of Lon Fuller's
articulation of central quality of mediation identified as maintenance of long-term relationships through
solution worked out by parties); see also ROSEMARY O'LEARY & LISA B. BINGHAM, A MANAGER'S GUIDE
TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS 25 (2007) (identifying positive effects resulting
from managers' awareness of need to listen). But see Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Process of Repair
- or Separation? An Empirical Study and Its Implications, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 331 (2002) ("Even
when able mediators work with parties whose dispute arises in the context of a significant prior connection
with each other, relationship repairs in legal mediation appear to be uncommon events. ... ); Bobbi
McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in
Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 403, 429 (2002) (noting minority of lawyers voluntarily chose mediation
because of its ability to preserve parties' relationship); Roselle Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 67 (2004) (highest percentage
from various studies stated that 43% of litigants thought mediation improved relationships with other party;
most studies did not support this).
57 See Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 47, at 639 (describing term there as "reciprocal voice and
understanding" and with thanks to Bobbi McAdoo for suggesting term).
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need the opportunity to speak and be heard, but they also need the opportunity to
listen to each other, reflect upon what was said and demonstrate that they have
listened to each other.
58
For a variety of reasons, the achievement of mutual consideration can be a
significant challenge. At least some percentage of disputing parties-perhaps those
who are less polarized, afraid or stressed; inherently creative; reasonably assertive
and confident; able to achieve some distance from their dispute-will be able to
engage in the elicitive, facilitative, and transformative process described supra and
ultimately craft their own resolution, one that they will implement through good
times and bad.59 The needs of these parties-provided there is also some surplus to
divide in their bargaining zone and/or the opportunity for logrolling or the creation
of new, integrative options-will be fully met by a mediation in which the mediator
limits herself to the use of facilitative, elicitive and perhaps transformative
interventions.
Parties who do not quite match this profile may be lucky enough to be assisted
by lawyers who possess the creativity, assertiveness, empathy, rationality and
detachment that their clients lack. These lawyers also may fully understand, respect
and be able to communicate the needs of their clients.60 Furthermore, these lawyers
may possess a full complement of the more traditional abilities of the lawyer-
sufficient substantive knowledge to provide competent representation, along with
the ability to analyze, speak and write "like a lawyer."'61 Parties represented by these
lawyers may also find their needs sufficiently met by a facilitative, elicitive and/or
transformative model of mediation.62
But for those parties who cannot achieve a sufficiently-positive problem-
solving state---or when their lawyers do not possess the skills and knowledge
58 See id. at 639 (noting positive and negative reactions to real mediation between parents and school
officials); see also Shestowsky, supra note 51, at 567 (noting main ADR goal gives individuals self-
determination over mediation).
59 See PRUITr ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 2004)
(describing evolution of conflict).
60 See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 23 (UBC Press 2008) (arguing "the new lawyer" must have evolved beliefs and practices).
61 Within the past couple of years, there have been increasing calls for law schools to prepare law students
for the sort of skillful and ethical use of substantive legal knowledge that is suggested here. See ROY
STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 8 (2007) (outlining
goals for law school classes); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 17 (2007) (analyzing law school teaching methods); see also MACFARLANE, supra note
60, at 23 (discussing what distinguishes new lawyering from old lawyering); John Lande & Jean Stemlight,
The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World
Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. OF DiSP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2010). Interestingly, as long ago as 1997, two
faculty members at the Dickinson School of Law of Penn State University prepared and taught a course that
specifically integrated bankruptcy law and mediation skills. Peter C. Alexander et al., Integrating Alternative
Dispute Resolution into the Bankruptcy Curriculum, 102 DICK L. REV. 259, 260 (1998) (noting class goal in
creating one form of bankruptcy resolution).
62 1 do, however, have concerns about the likelihood of such parties begin able to work through the
inevitable problems that will arise in the implementation of an agreement that requires an ongoing
relationship. See Peter Kamminga, (Aug. 15, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tilburg University) (on
file with author) (regarding use of consensual processes in construction industry).
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described supra or do not have an ideal relationship with their clients, or when there
is no surplus to divide-the more appropriate mediation process may be one in
which the mediator first listens with an open mind and in a manner that conveys
respect and then moves toward dignified, participatory education of the parties
about their options, advises them about the fairness of these options, and helps them
to make an appropriate choice. These procedural characteristics, of course, are
consistent with a model of mediation that begins in a facilitative manner then, if
necessary, begins to include evaluative or directive elements. I hasten to add,
however, that these characteristics are not consistent with coercive or muscle
mediation.
Research suggests that institutional and financial pressures have forced court-
connected mediation (and mediators) to become predominantly evaluative,
directive-and even coercive. Many have laid the blame for this transformation at
lawyers' doors,63 observing that lawyers' participation has made the mediation
process more adversarial and single-mindedly focused on the law and legal
procedures. There is much to support this assessment. Lawyers tend to select other
lawyers as mediators, dominate the discussions in the mediation process, seek case
valuation and reality-testing, and focus on brokering a deal.64 The achievement of
mutual understanding between the parties seems to be an issue that some lawyers
think about
65 but not many.
66
63 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith In Mediation - Requested, Recommended or Required? A New
Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 593 (1997) (The increase of court-connected mediation and the incorporation
of lawyers into the process have stripped mediation of its benefits as an alternative to the adversarial system
and is in danger of becoming another "hoop" on the path to litigation. "The notion of mediation as a different
paradigm for dispute resolution is being eroded with the lawyers now viewing the process as merely another
tool within the litigation arena to be used combatively rather for any intended purpose."); Leonard L Riskin,
The Represented Client in A Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1081 (1991) (arguing lawyers adversarial nature narrows settlement visions);
Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 867 (positing courts, not lawyers, should present mediation opportunities);
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 797-98 (noting lawyers make mediation look like judicial settlement
conferences).
64 See Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 445, 446 (2007) (arguing "that due
to disparities in knowledge, power, and interests between litigants and attorneys, plaintiffs and defendants
are regularly not afforded communication opportunities to address issues of prime importance to them during
the processing of their cases"); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 893 (describing existing current empirical
research on this point); Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Arbitration in the Superior Court of Arizona: A
Study of its Performance and Proposed Rule Changes, 2007 J. DIsP. RESOL. 65, 90-91 (2007) (arguing
lawyers favor judicializing the process by having the courts provide some. type of compulsory alternative
process); Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 17, at 26 (comparing lawyer involved mediations with
judicial settlement conferences); see also Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 797 (claiming some
believe lawyers "hijacked" mediation process).
65 See MACFARLANE, supra note 60, at 149-50 (describing collaborative law and value of client
participation and discussion between parties); John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative
Law and other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619, 626-28 (2007) (providing background
of collaborative law); Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuading
the Legal Profession to Define Problems Humanistically, 2008 J. DiSP. RESOL. 45, 58-59 (2008) [hereinafter
Welsh, Looking Down the Road] (discussing lawyers who practice mediation and understanding of parties'
interest); see also McAdoo, supra note 13, at 398-99 tbl.8 (2007) (observing among top reasons judges
order cases to mediation is because they believe process "gets clients directly involved in discussions").
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It is also important to note, however, that this transformation may have
something to do with the courts themselves-and particularly with the courts'
relative lack of resources and focus on "speedy" and "inexpensive, 67 disposition.
Some courts now assume that a mediation will be completed in an hour. Courts
have long tracked the rate at which mediation successfully settles cases and have
regularly noted mediation's value as a means to reduce the size of the court's
docket.68 None of these preferences or behaviors is inherently evil. Instead, as
courts deal constantly with cost-conscious administrators, intrusive legislators, and
unhappy citizens who arrive with difficult problems that require timely resolution,
courts are acting in a manner consistent with institutional self-preservation.69
And there is one other factor that must be considered-the parties themselves.
Very few people go directly to court after they have been harmed. Most people-
even allegedly litigious Americans-prefer not to go to court.7v Plaintiffs must
proceed through a multi-stage psychological process-naming, blaming, and
claiming 7 '-before they sue defendants. Usually, at least one of the parties
involved in this lawsuit has tried to negotiate with the other-and has been
unsuccessful. 72 In the United States, research shows that only a small percentage of
66 See Relis, supra note 64, at 463-64 (noting female and/or in-house hospital lawyers were more likely to
raise this possibility); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 869-73 (discussing goal of mediation is to attend to
parties' needs but evidence shows this is rarity); Welsh, Looking Down the Road, supra note 65, at 50-51
(hypothesizing about why so many lawyers find it so difficult to deal with emotional issues and how those
issues may benefit from acknowledgment in legal practice). Meanwhile, judges referring parties to mediation
do seem impressed with this potential benefit of the process. See McAdoo, supra note 13, at 398-99 (stating
judicial preference for discussion between parties as result of mediation).
67 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. (stating every action should be just, speedy and inexpensive).
68 See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 25, at 406 (explaining modem realization that ADR is cost and time
efficient); Moffitt, supra note 5; Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic
Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 129-30 (2004) [hereinafter Welsh, Court-Connected
Mediation] (documenting trend in judicial deferral to arbitration due to efficiency and lower cost).
69 See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113
HARv. L. REV. 924, 936-37 (2000) (describing evolution of ADR as method of controlling judicial case
overload, and its evolution from pre-trial); see also Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes his Justice":
Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation,
90 GEO. L.J. 607, 649 (2002) (discussing judicial welcome to alternative dispute resolution to ease
caseload); Welsh, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 68, at 141 (discussing mediator's role in keeping
people happy and delivering justice).
70 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 22 (1983) [hereinafter
Galanter, Reading the Landscapes of Disputes] (detailing study result finding only approximately 5% of
inter-organizational disputes went to trial) (citing Hurst, The Functions of Courts in the United States, 1950-
1980, 15 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 401, 422 (1980) ("The absence of sizeable numbers of legal actions in which
individuals or firms of substantial or large means appear on both sides of lawsuits.")).
71 See William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 635-36 (1980) (explaining three-step process before trial of
naming injury, blaming other party, and claiming grievance by voicing to third party and instigating trial).
Note that the "claiming" part also can be quite expensive, beyond many people's means. See id. at 636-37
(stating costs to parties may limit access to justice and ability to bring claims).
72 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 525, 537 tbl.2 (1980) (showing 32% of all grievances come to no agreement
following negotiation and 30.6% reach agreement after difficulty).
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those who perceive that they have suffered a harm end up bringing a lawsuit.73 It
should not be surprising, then, that many of these disputing parties who have finally
reached the courthouse find it hard to believe that a reasonably fair resolution with
the other party is possible. 74 Many-though certainly not al1-have given up any
hope for a voluntary, jointly-developed resolution and now prefer to trust the
judgment of a stranger, someone they hope will not only be impartial but
benevolent, knowledgeable, and fair.76 Indeed, research has shown that parties are
more likely to perceive a mediation process as fair if the mediator listens but also
engages at some point in an evaluative or directive intervention-e.g., if she helps
parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. 77 I have suggested
elsewhere that the parties may turn to mediators in this manner because they seek
reassurance that the resolution they are considering is reasonably fair.78
Significantly, though, parties are much less receptive to mediators who go further
and try to tell the parties what to do-i.e., recommend specific settlements.79 In
73 Galanter, Reading the Landscapes of Disputes, supra note 70, at 20 (The Civil Litigation Research
Project found that only 5% median and 17% mean of organizational disputes actually go to court. The
Milwaukee Consumer Dispute Study found that of the people that reported problems, only 3% took claims to
third party, and another study by Best and Andreasen found that only 3.5% of those consumers that voiced
complaints involved third parties); Marc Galanter, A World Without Trial?, 2006 J. DISp. RESOL. 7, 9-10
(2006) (The National Center for State Courts, where 98% of the trials occur, complied a bank of state trial
data between 1976 and 2002 and reported that the courts of general jurisdiction in 22 states reported declines
in the amount of dispositions from 1.8% in 1976 to 0.6% in 2002, as well as a reduction of overall criminal
trials from 8.5% in 1976 to 3.3% in 2002. This trend is the same in federal courts.); Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459, 498 (2004) (noting portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell
from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002. There was also a similar 60% decline in the absolute number of trials
since the mid 1980s. Trials are declining in every case category. A similar decline in both the percentage and
the absolute number of trials is found in federal criminal cases and in bankruptcy cases. In 1985, there were
9.287 trials in bankruptcy court; by 2002, there were 3.179- little more than one third of 1985 total).
74 Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9
JUST. Sys. J, 151, 153 (1984) (noting by the time conflict comes to court it is serious enough that plaintiff
wants outside intervention because they do not want to take dispute back into their own hands).
75 See Relis, supra note 64, at 478-79 (describing patients and doctors who wanted to talk with each other
in medical malpractice mediations); see also Hensler, supra note 17, at 189 (claiming facilitative mediator,
unlike evaluative mediator, would be more helpful in finding joint gains and allowing parties to come to own
settlements as opposed to proposing resolution).
76 Compare Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perception of Dispute Resolution Procedures:
An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REv. 63 (2008) (finding empirical data
showed parties are more attracted initially to third-party control were satisfied when they experienced
adjudication), with Wissler, Effects of Mandatory Mediation, supra note 54, at 584-85 (discovering mixed
effects on evaluations of mediation process from parties who were required to mediate as opposed to those
who voluntarily mediate).
77 See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know From
Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 641, 664, 698 (2002) [hereinafter Wissler, General
Civil Cases] (explaining 49% of parties thought mediation gave them better understanding of strengths and
weaknesses and arguing parties in mediation felt mediation process was more fair when they were better
prewared).
McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 25, at 425 (claiming mediators produce fair outcomes especially when
theq provide reassurance that outcomes are consistent with rule of law).
See Wissler, General Civil Cases, supra note 77, at 684-85 (showing party felt more pressure to accept
settlement from mediator who recommended particular settlement, while attorney felt mediation was more
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particular, non-settling parties perceive the process as less fair when mediators
engage in this intervention.
All of this research suggests that most, though not all, parties want advice from
someone they have decided they can trust. Other research, meanwhile, suggests
that lawyers and other repeat players prefer an actual decision-provided that it is
reached efficiently, consistent with the law and their expectations, and very likely to
be complied with or enforced. They seem to care less than the average person-a
one-shot player8°--about procedural justice. Indeed, some research suggests that
lawyers' and repeat players' positive perceptions regarding the process will be much
less likely to influence their assessments of the fairness or unfairness of the
outcome. 81
All of these factors may combine to explain the current directive or evaluative
cast of much court-connected mediation, which exists in order to assist the mass
processing of cases and is dominated by repeat players.82 Further, the factors
described supra certainly can tempt mediators and court-connected mediation
programs to use, or acquiesce in the use of, coercive or muscle mediation in order to
achieve settlements.83
III. INTRODUCTION OF MEDIATION INTO BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Mediation was first integrated into bankruptcy courts when the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of California established a mediation program in
1986.84 Courts in other parts of the country soon followed suit.85 After passage of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, bankruptcy judges began experimenting with
ADR, including mediation, on an ad hoc basis. 86 That same year, under the auspices
fair after mediator had suggested possible settlement option); see also Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 874
("Most Lawyers ... prefer that retired judges or experienced litigators with relevant substantive expertise
serve as their mediators.").
80 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1353 (1994) (describing one shot players as individuals who file
lawsuits, settle claim instead of litigating, and are unhappy with settlement outcome).
81 See Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, supra note 48, at 170-71 (describing recent
research); see also JANE ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT
ARBITRATION PROGRAM 61-62 (1983) (discussing difference between organizational and individual parties'
reactions to Pittsburgh arbitration program).
82 See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 865-66 (stating "court-oriented" mediations allow "repeat
players" to settle more issues without interference).
I must admit that when I think of the contrast between educating or coaching parties in
evaluative/directive mediation vs. browbeating or berating parties in coercive/muscle mediation, I recall a
recent episode of the Penguins of Madagascar in which the lead penguin announces, "1 find reason tedious
and boring. We'll use force." The Penguins of Madagascar: Gone in a Flash (Nickelodeon television
broadcast November 28, 2008). Since this television show is a comedy, I believe that the penguins' use of
force fails to achieve its intended result. In real life, of course, that is not always the case.
84 See Cassandra G. Mott, Note, Macy's Miracle on 34th Street: Employing Mediation to Develop the
Reorganization Plan in a Mega-Chapter 11 Case, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 193, 198 (1998).
85 See id. at 199 (stating Bankruptcy courts in Middle District of Florida and Eastern District of Virginia
imitated Southern District of California).
86 See id. at 196 (discussing how judges experimented with different forms of alternative dispute
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of the American Arbitration Association, bankrupt Greyhound Lines Inc. offered
the first pre-reorganization plan mediation to thousands of individuals who had
brought personal injury and property damage claims against the company, as a
result of traffic accidents involving Greyhound vehicles.8 7 In late 1993, the
Bankruptcy Court for the influential Southern District of New York created its
court-connected mediation program. 88 One of the first referrals to the program
involved the chapter 11 reorganization of R. H. Macy & Co. 89 The mediator in that
case was Cyrus Vance, and the mediation process, which lasted two weeks, was
"called Camp Mediation by the creditors' army of lawyers and bankers. '" 90 By 1995,
twelve bankruptcy courts had adopted court-connected ADR programs.9' Then, with
the passage of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, federal bankruptcy
courts received express authorization to use ADR processes, including mediation.92
By 2004, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was requiring that
before parties could proceed with certain adversary proceedings, they had to attempt
to reach resolution through mediation.
93
Today, as a result of the work of Professor Ralph Peeples, we know that 40
bankruptcy courts have rules or standing orders that permit mediation.94 Professor
William Woodward has revealed that, in addition to interesting experimentation
with mediation in preference cases and bankruptcy appeals, a bankruptcy procedure
spawned both the Piper Trust and a claims process that requires use of mediation. 95
Our unfortunately-difficult current economic conditions, combined with the
successful use of mediation in this and other contexts, make it very likely that the
use of mediation in bankruptcy will expand.
96
resolution).
87 See Penna, supra note 2 (discussing program set up by bankrupt Greyhound Lines Inc to deal with
personal injury and property claims).
88 See Mott, supra note 84, at 199 (acknowledging Judge Lifland foi helping bring about a court-annexed
mediation program in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York).
89 See id. at 194 (noting use of mediation in Macy's chapter II case).
90 Stephanie Strom, Macy's Biggest Sale - A Special Report: Derailing a Big Bankruptcy Plan, N.Y.
TiMES, July 29, 1994, at D1.
91 Ralph R. Mabey, et al., Expanding the Reach of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: The
Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of Mediation and the Other Forms of ADR, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1259,
1266 (1995) (establishing adoption of twelve "court-annexed ADR programs" in bankruptcy courts); Mott,
supra note 84, at 199 ("[T]welve bankruptcy courts have court-annexed ADR programs.").
See 28 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (1998) ("Each United States district court shall authorize, by local rule adopted
under section 2071(a), the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions, including
adversary proceedings in bankruptcy ....").
93 See Mark L. Desgrosseilliers, Gimme Shelter: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures to
Resolve Tort Claims in Bankruptcy, 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 19, 32 (2009) (demonstrating
Delaware Bankruptcy Court's mandate of mediation prior to certain proceedings).
94 See Ralph Peeples, The Uses of Mediation in Chapter 11 Cases, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 407
(2009) ("Mediation is explicitly authorized by local rule or order in 51 bankruptcy courts.").
95 See generally Woodward, supra note 1.
96 See Desgrosseilliers, supra note 93, at 43 (2009) (suggesting ADR procedures are viable options to
manage heavy load of bankruptcy litigation in future); Abigail Johnson, Mediation growing in bankruptcy
courts; Mediators help avoid costs of litigation, IND. LAW., April 19, 2006, at 6 ("At this point in his career,
Kleiman said mediation duties take up about 15 percent to 20 percent of his time. And, while mediation in
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IV. WHAT RECENT BANKRUPTCY CASES SUGGEST ABOUT COURTS' AND PARTIES'
UNDERSTANDING OF MEDIATION AND MEDIATORS
As noted supra, relatively few judicial opinions discuss the use of mediation in
bankruptcy. There are several obvious reasons for this. First, bankruptcy courts
have only recently begun to use mediation.97 Second, because mediation is
confidential, can be initiated privately, 98 and requires the parties' agreement in order
to produce an outcome, bankruptcy judges99 are relatively unlikely to be called upon
to resolve issues involving mediation. 00 The few cases available nonetheless
demonstrate that bankruptcy courts generally favor the use of mediation to resolve
claims and help with reorganizations. One case, which is a bit of an anomaly,lO'
represents a cautionary tale in which creative parties attempted to use mediation as
a convenient, unregulated tool that would permit them to achieve unexpected and
inappropriate results.102 A bankruptcy judge, who balked at using mediation in this
manner, stopped these parties. 10 3 Some other bankruptcy judges and parties,
however, apparently expect mediators to do more than facilitate communication,
the bankruptcy court is becoming more common, Kleiman definitely sees it as a growth area." David
Kleiman was the first mediator to handle a case for the bankruptcy court in Indianapolis in the late 1990s.).
97 See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 52-53 (2006) [hereinafter Coben & Thompson, Disputing Irony]
(describing likely reasons for relatively recent development of bankruptcy mediation jurisprudence); James
R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION REV. 395, 414 (2007) (explaining recent trends in mediation).
98 There may be some limitations on the ability to contract for private mediation in the bankruptcy context
due to the requirement in II U.S.C. § 363 that the Debtor to receive court approval for payments made
outside of the ordinary course. Mediation costs may be included within that scope. II U.S.C § 363(b)(1)
(2006). My thanks to Margaret Whiteman Greecher for this observation.
99 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2006)
(exploring whether specialization of bankruptcy judges enables superior decision making).
1oo See Coben & Thompson, Disputing Irony, supra note 97, at 52-53 (describing related reasons for
relative paucity of mediation jurisprudence).
'o1 Or the egregious tip of the iceberg. See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in
Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 596 (2001) (remarking on abuses of process within ADR system). My
thanks to Chris Honeyman for noting this possibility.
102 See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (remarking on attempt by
party to abuse mediation process). Reminiscent of the creative financiers whose new investment vehicles
helped to create our current economic crisis. See Joseph Philip Forte, Disruption in the Capital Markets:
What Happened? 22 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. 8, 11 (2008) (discussing various loan
products utilized during real estate boom). However, lawyers seeking to use mediation in seemingly
inappropriate ways might not be purposing these methods out of malice or to gain an unfair advantage but
rather to pursue an altruistic means, such as expediating recovery for entitled and needy tort claimants. For
example, see generally Penna, supra note 2 (reporting that Thomas Lauria, attorney for Greyhound,
explained his client had intiated ADR in part to "balance bankruptcy policies which require efficient estate
adminstration, on the one hand, and [responding to] the interests of personal injury and property damage
claimants, on the one hand, who need and indeed are entitled to quick payments of their claims-without
having to get involved in the ordinary complexity and delays associated with large corporate bankruptcy.").




negotiation, and resolution. They expect mediators to make decisions and then
grant substantial deference to those decisions. Admittedly, mediation is relatively
ill-defined. Nonetheless, these judges and parties clearly do not understand even
the existing, relatively minimal boundaries that define mediation and mediators.
One of the most significant uses of mediation in the bankruptcy context is the
inclusion of the process in chapter 11 reorganization plans, in order to resolve
claims that do not come within the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy procedures.
Courts appear to favor the process in this context, provided that it is being used in a
manner that treats all interested parties appropriately--or at least not
inappropriately. For example, in In re Eagle Bus Manufacturing,0 4 the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas approved a pre-
reorganization plan involving three-tiered ADR (i.e., offer and exchange; followed
by 60 days of mediation; then binding arbitration). 0 5 In particular, the court
approved the plan's use of these ADR procedures to resolve unsecured creditors'
claims of personal injury, wrongful death claims and workers compensation.10 6 In
all three types of claims, liability was contested but could not be resolved in the
bankruptcy court. 107 In approving the ADR plan in this case, the court affirmed
ADR's ability to bridge the jurisdictional difficulties created by parallel proceedings
in trial and bankruptcy courts and to bridge the standing issues created by
bankruptcy's hierarchy of creditors. Specifically, the ADR plan permitted
unsecured creditors to reach resolution of their non-bankruptcy claims outside the
context of the bankruptcy action.
In contrast, in 2009, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania denied a fifth'08 reorganization plan proposed by Skinner Engine
Company, based on the court's conclusion that the ADR plan was neither reasonable
nor entered into in good faith.'0 9 Somewhat like the plan in In re Eagle Bus
Manufacturing, Skinner's plan provided for mediation of personal injury, asbestos-
related claims that had been brought against the debtor." 0 But Skinner's plan also
required the personal injury claimants to pay to Skinner twenty-percent of the
money they received from Skinner's insurers as a result of the mediation."'
According to the Bankruptcy Court, Skinner planned to use these proceeds to fund
its ADR plan and obtain a recovery for its general creditors." 2 Skinner thus had an
interest in assisting claimants and "abotage[ing] its own defense or, more aptly, the
104 134 B.R. 584 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991). Discussed in journal articles as the "Greyhound bankruptcy or
reorganization plan."
0 See id. at 586, 591 (confirming reorganization plan including three-step ADR); Penna, supra note 2, at
3 (describing three-tiered ADR process).
06 See In re Eagle Bus Mfg., 134 B.R. at 591.
07 See id. (noting Bankruptcy Court may not have jurisdiction to hear these particular claims).
108 According to the court's opinion, this represented at least the fifth chapter I 1 plan proposed "within a
span of some five to six years." In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 427.
" Id at 422.
"0Id. at 418, 422.
..Id. at 422.
112 Id. at427 & n.7.
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Insurers' defense" of Skinner." 3 Not surprisingly, and particularly because they had
never made any payments on these claims, some of which had existed for 20
years,114 Skinner's insurers objected to this scheme." 5 The court labeled the ADR
plan "collusion" ' 16 and held that Skinner's reorganization plan was "unconfirmable"
without the insurers' consent." 17 Ultimately, the court found the reorganization plan
so troublesome that it converted Skinner's chapter 11 reorganization into a chapter 7
liquidation." 8 This case is an extreme example that illustrates both abuse of the
mediation process and the limits of courts' willingness to look favorably upon
mediation's unique ability to bridge jurisdictional boundaries and aid reorganizing
debtors.
The case also illustrates some parties' total-and seemingly willful-lack of
respect for the different roles of mediator and judge. Indeed, the case may be an
example of the potential for creatively manipulative parties to use mediation's and
mediators' ambiguous definitions to try to avoid the limits-jurisdictional,
substantive, and procedural-established by law."l9 Specifically, Skinner and its co-
Proponents' proposed Alternative Dispute Resolution Process called upon the
presiding judge to serve as "an arbitrator, mediator, or something else"'120 yet "to
make final binding determinations as to the validity and valuation of contested opt-
in Asbestos Claims"'' , thus requiring the court "in its official capacity, to finally
liquidate such claims, and without any chance for review by another court.' 22 One
problem with the parties' plan, of course, is that, by law, bankruptcy courts do not
113 Id. at 423.
114 Id. at 421.
5 1d. at 418.
Id. at 423.
117 Id. at 426-27 (concluding confirmable plan could not be effectuated because of failure to obtain
Insurers' consent, among other reasons).
"s Id. Debtors who have run out of cash before their plan can be confirmed may themselves seek to
convert their chapter 11 bankruptcy into a chapter 7 bankruptcy. See II U.S.C. § 11 12(b)(4) (2006) (listing
causes for conversion to case under chapter 7). That does not seem to have been the case here. See In re Am.
Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426-27 (stating conversion to chapter 7 was appropriate due to inability to
effectuate confirmable plan).
119 One cannot also help but be reminded of the Bush Administration's creation of (and Congress' apparent
acquiescence in) military commissions to handle the Guantanamo detainees. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229, 2240-41 (2008) (holding Military Commissions Act of 2006 did not strip alien detainees of
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559-60 (2006) (concluding
military commission was not authorized by Congress and violated domestic and international); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) ("address[ing] the process that is constitutionally owed to one who
seeks to challenge his classification as" an enemy combatant); see also Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional
Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 967, 968 (2009) (arguing design of post-
September 1 1th military commissions focused on effectiveness and not legitimacy). At the same time, it is
important to acknowledge that Skinner and its Co-Proponents may have been motivated by an altruistic
goal-e.g., to ensure that the claimants received some amount of recovery despite the insurers' resistance.
120 See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426.
121 Id. at 425 ("Provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process repeatedly call for this Court, in
its official capacity, to make final binding determinations as to the validity and valuation of contested opt-in
Asbestos Claims ....").
122 See id at 426 (explaining how debtor and Co-Proponent argued arbitration process requires court to
liquidate claims in present case without chance of review by other courts).
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possess the authority to finally liquidate the sorts of claims that had been brought by
the Asbestos Claimants. Such liquidation represents a "noncore proceeding"'123-
and as the Bankruptcy Court Judge M. Bruce McCullough went on to observe:
"[T]he Court may only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court with respect to noncore proceedings .... [T]his Court is powerless to
make a final determination regarding the liquidation of any opt-in Asbestos Claims
that are disputed." 1
24
By simply changing the judge's title-from "judge" to "arbitrator, mediator, or
something else"-the parties apparently hoped to avoid the bankruptcy court's
inconvenient jurisdictional limits (and perhaps the need to pay the substantial fees
that would be required for a private arbitrator, mediator or other type of neutral).
And what would give the parties who had developed this Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process the power to revoke the title of "judge" and replace it with
"arbitrator, mediator, or something else"? Clearly frustrated, Judge McCullough
summarized (and critiqued) the parties' arguments as follows:
The Court understands the Debtor and the Co-Proponents to
respond.. .that (a) the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process
constitutes part of a settlement of the Asbestos Claims, and (b) this
Court's final liquidation of contested opt-in Asbestos Claims,
because it is part of such process, can be done regardless of this
Court's lack of authority to so finally liquidate outside of such
process. By logical extension, this Court can only presume that, by
arguing that this Court can so finally liquidate within the confines
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process notwithstanding this
Court's lack of authority to otherwise so finally liquidate, the
Debtor and the Co-Proponents argue, as well, that this Court (a) is
free to act (and will act when finally liquidating within the confines
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process) other than as the
presiding Court that it is vis-d-vis the instant bankruptcy case-for
instance, as an arbitrator, mediator, or something else, and (b) may
thereby transgress the legal confines of its official position.
Unfortunately for the Debtor and the Co-Proponents, this Court is
Id. at 425 ("[T]he liquidation of unliquidated personal injury tort claims, as are the opt-in Asbestos
Claims, constitute(s) a noncore proceeding ....").
124 Id. (observing Court is allowed to only issue "proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law ... with
respect to noncore proceedings" and no power exists to makes determinations on liquidation of claims in
dispute); see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2006) ("Core proceedings include, but are not limited to allowance
or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of
claims or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan . . . but not the liquidation or estimation of
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort ...."). It is conceivable, but beyond the scope of this Article,
that the Debtor and its Co-Proponents may have claimed that an exception applied. See, e.g., In re UAL
Corp., 310 B.R. 373, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 2004) (defining bankruptcy court's decision to time-bar personal
injury claim as broad view of liquidation exception because it "effectively liquidate[d] the claim for purposes
of distribution" and defining narrow view as specifically "fixing the amount of the claim").
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unaware of any legal authority that would permit it to so act while,
at the same time, it also acts as the presiding Court. Furthermore,
the relevant provisions of the Fifth Plan and CADP cited to above
refer to this Court as "the Bankruptcy Court" when it makes its
final determinations thereunder, which indicates to the Court that
the Debtor and the Co-Proponents expect that this Court, when
making final determinations within the confines of the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Process, will only act within its official capacity
as the presiding Court in the instant bankruptcy case. Acting in
such official capacity, this Court, as set forth above, may not finally
liquidate contested opt-in Asbestos Claims, and even to the extent
that it can act with respect to such claims, such action will
necessarily be reviewable by another court.
25
The parties' position here-which would have allowed them and the court to
"contract out" of the legal restrictions established by statute-was not necessarily
unprincipled. Within the past few years, legal commentators have urged that
statutes and court rules should be understood as merely "default" rules, subject to
revision by parties who can imagine and implement dispute resolution procedures
that are more responsive to their needs. 126 The Supreme Court has recently dealt
with parties arguing that they, not the Federal Arbitration Act, should be able to
dictate the judicial standard of review to be used in determining whether to vacate
an arbitral award. (The Court has rejected that argument. 12 7) Professor Leonard
Riskin and I have argued recently that courts should be willing to customize the
mediation process. 28 In recent years, as well, the line between private and public
entities has become blurred. 129 Further, there are some judges who have willingly
125 In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426 (emphasis added) (stating lack of"any legal authority" would
allow court to act in two capacities). In a footnote, the court observed that the Debtor and its Co-Proponents
could simply remove the court from the ADR Process and thus "rectify the flaw that the Court has just
identified regarding such process." See id at 426, 426 n.6. But the court added, "However, such removal of
the Court would serve to make the Asbestos Claims Settlement, which incorporates the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process, even more unreasonable than it has already been determined to be by the Court." Id
126 See Symposium, Competing And Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure and ADR, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 481 (2005); see also Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil
Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007) ("1 argue that the current set of procedural
rules should be treated as default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable parameters."); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers'
Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of
Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REv. 475, 519-20 (2005) (discussing stringency of immutable rules and
potential bargaining and flexibility involved with default rules).
127 See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1401 (2008) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit's holding
"terms of the arbitration agreement controlling the mode of judicial review are unenforceable and
severable").
128 See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 919 (discussing how courts should offer to "customize"
mediation as new program).
129 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285
(2003) (advocating privatization as means to accomplish public utilitarian goals); see also Ellen Dannin, Red
Tape or Accountability: Privatization,
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become and called themselves 'mediators." 30  Though well-intentioned and
principled people can differ regarding the wisdom of this semantic choice when the
mediator-judge does not and will not be required to preside over the case at trial,13 '
there can be no doubt of the coercive twist that a mediation has taken when the
mediator and the presiding judge are the same person. 132
So there is some sort of precedent for the arguments made by Skinner, its co-
Proponents, and their lawyers. In 2009, however, in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, these parties took this concept too far. They tried
to use arbitration, mediation "or something else" to force Skinner's insurers into the
role of (unwilling) investors in Skinner's continued operation, and they tried to force
a presiding judge into the role of an (unwilling) "alternative" neutral. 33 Arguably,
the parties' plan represented the creation of just another new, inoffensive hybrid
process. To invoke a very old phrase, however, these parties tried to use mediation
Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 151 (2006) (arguing against
privatization as means for regulating public matters); Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-
Public Intelligence Partnership in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008) (illustrating use of
private sector to combat "War on Terror"). The law has evolved to permit "state action" claims against
private parties engaged in a public function. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (holding private non-profit organization regulating high school sports was
state actor); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 993-1016 (2000) (applying state action doctrine to private
conduct in ADR context).
130 Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Eyes on the Prize: The Struggle for Professionalism, DISP. RESOL.
MAG, Spring 2005, at 13, 14 (disclosing judge's response to confidentiality concerns raised when judge is
both mediator and adjudicator).
131 See Elizabeth S. Stong, Some Reflections from the Bench on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Business
Bankruptcy Cases, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 387, 395 (2009) (suggesting parties would be less willing to
take unreasonable positions before judge serving as mediator). The line dividing mediations from judicial
settlement conferences, for example, may be a fine one. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement
Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16-30 (1987) (discussing
several different formats of judicial settlement conferences); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 510-11 (1985)
(describing judges' role at many settlement conferences as hybrid form of mediation-arbitration).
132 See Welsh & McAdoo, supra note 130, at 14 (demonstrating difficulty for parties' to object to trial
judge serving as mediator); see also James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate
Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, DIsP. RESOL. MAG, Fall 1999, at 11, 11 (supporting judges serving as
mediators unless judge is presiding over parties' trial); Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 21, 21 (concurring with Professor Alfini). This innovation particularly raises
serious questions about the application of confidentiality or the mediation privilege to a process called
mediation. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, § 3(b)(3) 7A Pt. Ill U.L.A. 110 (2003) (providing Act does not apply
to mediation "conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case").
13' They also tried to force the Asbestos Claimants into "volunteering" to assign 20% of their awards, upon
electing to use the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process. There are some echoes here of the arguments
made by employers, credit companies and others who insert mandatory arbitration clauses in their boilerplate
agreements with employees, consumers, etc. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the
Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 413 (2009) (summarizing party inequality
problems present in arbitration arising from form clauses); Jean Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (2001)
(illustrating consumer and employee opposition to mandatory arbitration in contracts of adhesion); see also
Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 696-97 (2001) (outlining
academic criticisms of consumer arbitration clauses).
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to 'have their cake and eat it too.' A careful judge, 134 apparently alerted by skilled
lawyers representing self-interested insurers, 135 carefully examined the details of the
proposed plan and its consequences and stopped the potential abuse of mediation,
ADR more generally, the bankruptcy court, and federal statutes. 131
In contrast, other cases signal that at least some bankruptcy judges do not fully
understand the appropriate limits of the mediator's role. Indeed, some courts
sometimes seem to view mediators largely as substitutes for trustees, special
masters, arbitrators, magistrates or examiners-none of whom is a judge but all of
whom have an evaluative or adjudicative function similar to that of a judge. Only
mediators' enhanced ability to protect the confidentiality of what is said, done, and
produced during the mediation process seems worth notice-and use.1
37
In 1998, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida
approved a joint motion to appoint a mediator. 138 In its opinion, the Bankruptcy
134 Reminiscent of Justice Scalia, with his dissent in Hamdi, noting that neither the plurality of the
Supreme Court nor Congress nor the Executive had used or applied the law appropriately. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is a certain harmony of approach in the
plurality's making up for Congress's failure to invoke the Suspension Clause and its making up for the
Executive's failure to apply what it says are needed procedures - an approach that reflects what might be
called a Mr. Fix-it Mentality. The plurality seems to view it as its mission to Make Everything Come Out
Right, rather than merely decree the consequences .... )_
1 Indeed, the court explicitly referenced the Insurers' arguments. In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415,
422-23 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) ("Debtor can obtain ... proceeds.., only if the Debtor's defense - or, more
accurately, the Insurers' defense of the Debtor - with respect to such claim(s) is unsuccessful."). It is well
beyond the scope of this Article to determine the strength of many of those arguments, particularly: whether
Pennsylvania law was applicable here; whether Pennsylvania law effectively restricts parties from entering
into settlements without their insurers' consent; whether such a settlement by the parties may be deemed
unreasonable simply because the insurer has refused to pay such claims for 20 years, etc. See id. at 419-22
(discussing whether state law restricts debtor's ability to settle without insurers' consent and whether
settlement was reasonable). I am also unable to determine the extent to which the judge's careful analysis
was based upon the work of an astute judicial clerk.
136 This cautionary tale may be useful fodder for those currently arguing that coverage of the law related to
ADR should be "mainstreamed" in the law school curriculum. See id. at 425 (noting how settlement had to
be rejected due to its creation through unintended use of alternative dispute resolution).
137 See Nancy A. Welsh, Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S., in MEDIATION EN VERTROUWELIJKHEID
(MEDIATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY) (Hester Montree and Alexander Oosterman, eds., 3d ed., 2009); see
also LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 328-41 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing
how mediation requires confidentiality to promote effective resolution between parties and how Uniform
Mediation Act of 2003 provides mediation communications are neither subject to discovery nor admissible
in evidence except in very limited circumstances); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private
Settlements, in WHATS FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 507, 507, 511 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael
Wheeler eds., 2004) (analyzing how despite movement to require disclosure of settlement agreements
dealing with issues of public concern, "confidentiality and secrecy are often needed" to allow for effective
resolution of disputes when disclosure may damage parties involved and noting how potential for this
damage promotes confidentiality, privacy, and immunity in the mediation setting); Ellen E. Deason, The
Need for Trust as a Justification for Confidentiality in Mediation: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 54 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1387, 1387 (2006) (observing importance of confidentiality in mediation and describing how
mediator's enhanced ability to protect mediation communications is apparent from state legislatures across
our nation taking steps to protect confidentiality in this setting).
131 See In re Sargeant Farms, Inc., 224 B.R. 842, 844 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (appointing mediator upon
joint motion of parties to facilitate resolution of various issues within chapter 12 Bankruptcy case including
valuation of debtor's property after parties were unable to select mediator pursuant to initial Court Order).
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Court established the following procedures and terms for the mediation: the parties
were to split the cost of the mediator's services, who was to be compensated based
upon the magnitude and complexity of the proceedings; the mediator was to have
the authority to order depositions or interrogatories to any person or entity that
might possess information determined by the mediator to be necessary; and the
mediation was to be covered by a broad confidentiality rule.1 39 The court specified
that its confidentiality provisions did not mean that evidence otherwise produced
could not be used in "any further hearing in the case"' 40 but confidentiality was to
protect "what the parties and the mediator discuss[ed] and present[ed]"'141 in the
course of the mediation. Giving a mediator the authority to order discovery-an
authority generally reserved for judges, trustees, special masters, magistrates, and
arbitrators-and coupling it with confidentiality covering all of what was to be
discussed and presented in mediation seems to be a recipe for confusion and abuse
of process. 142
Similarly, when the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois
1 43
upheld a mediation and binding arbitration clause within a contract for the provision
of auditing services, the court appeared to expect the mediator to possess the
authority of an arbitrator. 44 The court appointed a trustee who filed an adversary
complaint for professional negligence and breach of contract against Checkers, the
1' See id at 847-48 (determining mediation procedures will follow above guidelines and all other
requirements delineated in Local Rule 9019-2 of United States Bankruptcy Court for Middle District of
Florida).
140 Id. at 848 (stating producible evidence could be used at further hearings despite court's that any
exception to confidentiality under Local Rule 9019-2 would not apply in bankruptcy).
141 Id.
142 See supra note 137; see also Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract
Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 71-73 (2001) (discussing confusion and
possible abuse in case where United States District Court for Northern District of California created its own
exception to confidentiality rules, allowing mediator to testify due to allegations of duress and in interest of
justice, which "justified the harms to the interests underlying the mediation privilege that would result from
disclosure," despite fact California courts are not authorized to create exceptions to confidentiality by
weighing necessity of disclosure).
14 See In re Griffin Trading Co., 250 B.R. 667, 672-73 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 2000) (ordering stay of adversary
proceeding between trustee and accounting firm when plain language of contract between debtor and
accounting firm provided differences should be resolved by mediation or arbitration).
144 See id. at 673 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 650 (1986))
(noting heavy presumption in favor of arbitration and stating arbitrability will be left to arbitrator when
parties have explicitly agreed to arbitration provision). Along with the mediation and arbitration clause, the
contract set forth specific services that Checkers, an accounting firm, would perform for Griffin, the debtor.
The contract included, among other provisions, the following: 1) auditing responsibilities; 2) making
"specific inquires of management and others about the representations embodied in the financial statement;"
3) examining Griffin's control system to ensure the safety of assets and that "transactions are executed in
accordance with management's authorization." Id. at 670. The contract also stated that any "differences
concerning our services or fees" will be sent to mediation, then arbitration. Id. at 672. During the time
Checkers was auditing Griffin, Griffin's CFO was trading stocks with company money. Id. at 670. Although
the auditors asked the CFO about a suspicious account, they did not investigate further. Id. A year after the
audit, Griffin filed for chapter 7 protection after the CFO came forward and admitted to losing
approximately $2,000,000. Id. at 671. Once appointed, the trustee filed a complaint against Checkers for
professional negligence and breach of contract. Id. at 669.
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organization that provided the auditing services. 145 The court held that the plain
language of the contract required the use of mediation, then arbitration, and,
therefore, the parties were bound by the clause. 46 More significantly for the
purposes of this Article, the court stated "if the parties clearly and unmistakably
agree to arbitrate, then the question of arbitrability is for an arbitrator."'
147
Presumably, the court also understood that the question of mediability would be for
the mediator.
Some courts' apparent confusion regarding the appropriate limits that should be
placed upon the role of the mediator also has emerged in a couple of cases in which
courts have had the opportunity to require and affirm the determinations of
mediators. In Hickox v. Friedland (In re HBLS, L.P.), 48 the Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York determined that a dispute arising out of a
mediation agreement should be submitted to the mediator for a decision and the
court then deferred to that decision. 149 The facts, as so often seems to be the case in
corporate reorganizations, are a little complicated. In 1993, HBLS filed for chapter
11 bankruptcy. 150 Charles Hickox ("Hickox") was a shareholder of HBLS and two
other corporations, LIR and MBM. 5 The three corporations ran a resort together
and were known as "Resort Entities."1 52 Prior to HBLS's chapter 11 filing, it was in
litigation with another group headed by Dion Friedland (for the purposes of this
Article, also known as "Friedland Group").153 With the help of a court-appointed
mediator, HBLS and Friedland Group reached a settlement of their lawsuit.
Included in the agreement was a "resolution clause" that stated that "any dispute or
determinations arising under, relating to or in connection with this Settlement
Agreement, its interpretation, performance or enforcement shall be determined
solely and exclusively by the Mediator, whose decision shall be final and binding
and non-appealable.
1 54
The Resort Entities defaulted on a payment agreed on in the "Settlement
Agreement" and after a number of disputes, the mediator made a final award to the
Friedland Group. 155 Under the Settlement Agreement, the final award was to have
the same force and effect as a final arbitration award due to the language of the
"resolution clause."' 156 The same day that the bankruptcy court adopted the
141 Id. at 669-70.
146 Id. at 673. "The heavy presumption in favor of arbitration shall be extended when there is a possibility
that a dispute is covered by an existing, valid arbitration clause." Id.
147 Id. at 674 (citing AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649).




"' Id at *4-5.
... Id. at *5.
"2 Id at *5.
153 Id. at *4 (recalling HBLS had been sued for defaulting under stock purchase agreement with Friedland).
154 Id. at *8.
... Id. at *9-12.
156 Id. at *8 (noting Settlement Agreement "shall be determined solely and exclusively by the Mediator,
whose decision shall be final and binding and non-appealable").
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mediator's final award, Friedland moved for entry of a deficiency judgment.
57
Hickox opposed this motion as against LIR and MBM, claiming that under the
Settlement Agreement, only HBLS was liable to Friedland Group. After some
extended procedural wrangling,' 58 the Bankruptcy Court submitted the specific
issue of LIR's and MBM's liability to the mediator. The mediator wrote a decision
declaring HBLS, LIR and MBM jointly and severally liable under the Settlement
Agreement. The bankruptcy court confirmed the mediator's award on the basis that
it was not in manifest disregard of the law 159 and reinstated a deficiency judgment
that it had entered earlier.
Hickox appealed to the district court, claiming that by seeking a deficiency
judgment, Friedland had waived the right to have the mediator arbitrate, 60 the claim
and also that the mediator's award was in error. As to the latter issue, the district
court determined that it had to "decide de novo whether the mediator's ruling was in
manifest disregard of the law."' 16 1 According to the court, there was "no basis to
overturn the mediator's award" because: 1) Hickox had attacked the Settlement
Agreement only on the merits and failed to allege the mediator's manifest disregard
of the law; 2) "the Mediator's interpretation of the terms of the Settlement
Agreement is not so clearly inconsistent with the Agreement's plain terms that the
Mediator could be said to have manifestly disregarded the law;" and 3) the Mediator
had firsthand knowledge of the parties' spirit and intent and had found that the
parties had conducted themselves as if they intended to make LIR and MBM
liable.
162
The most notable points here are that both the bankruptcy court and the district
court relied on a "mediator" to arbitrate and then applied a deferential 63 standard of
review that has been fashioned specifically for arbitration to this "mediator's
award."
Similarly, a court upheld a mediator's determination made in In re Eagle-
Pitcher Industries, Inc.' 64 The creditors and debtor in a chapter 11 proceeding had
S Id. at * 13.
d58 ., at *10-11 (highlighting liability dispute over expenses incurred from collateral shares sale by
Mediator). The Bankruptcy Court rejected Hickox's initial argument and entered a deficiency judgment
declaring HBLS, LIR, and MBM jointly and severally liable to Friedland. Id. at * 15. Hickox appealed this
ruling to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. Due to a lack of clarity in
the record regarding the presentation of the issue to the mediator and the basis for the Bankruptcy Court's
decision, the District Court remanded the case back to the Bankruptcy Court, which then held another
hearing, specifically submitted the issue of LIR's and MBM's liability to the mediator, and ultimately
affirmed the mediator's decision finding joint and several liability. Id. at * 16-18.
5 9 Id. at *31-32.
160 Id. at * 18. This is a bit oxymoronic.
161 Id. at *10.
1621d. at *10-12.
163 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (calling "manifest disregard" into
question by stating that it may not be new ground for review but way to refer to all of standards
collectively); Bosack v. Soward (In re Arbitration Between Bosack), 573 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Arbitrators exceed their powers when they express a 'manifest disregard of law,' or when they issue an
award that is 'completely irrational."').
164 176 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004).
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difficulties creating a reorganization plan, so the court appointed a "mediator" to
determine if the negotiations were at an impasse. With the help of the mediator, the
parties began to make progress towards a consensual plan. As part of the process,
the mediator met with "the active parties in sharpest disagreement."' 65 He did not
involve two of the creditor committees. When the agreement between the "active
parties" was announced to the other two committees, one committee made a
counterproposal.166 The mediation stalled. The mediator indicated his intent to send
a letter to the judge stating "at least for the time being, negotiations are at an
impasse."'167 Several weeks later, however, the mediator sent a "clarifying" letter to
counsel stating that they "should not consider those letters as declaring an
impasse."'168 In the meantime, the two excluded creditor-committees had filed
motions aimed at ending the period of exclusivity.1 69 In order to succeed on these
motions, they were required to show cause, such as delay by the debtor as a tactical
device or another action in bad faith. One committee argued that it had been treated
unfairly by being left out of the mediation and that this constituted sufficient
cause. 170 The court responded: "In the present bankruptcy case, all of the
constituencies acquiesced both in the initiation of mediation, and the selection of
the mediator. The mediator has expressed the view that impasse has not occurred..
• . This court sees no reason to question the judgment of the mediator on this
score." ' 7' The standard of review used by the court here is unclear but it certainly
appears deferential. The court upheld the determination of the mediator and refused
to terminate the period of exclusivity.
172
The bankruptcy cases described here suggest that bankruptcy courts and repeat
players are exhibiting some confusion regarding the appropriate roles of mediation
and mediators. Further, these cases suggest that bankruptcy courts and repeat
players may wish to seek neutrals who possess both consensual skills and
adjudicative authority. This Article will now turn to the evolution of divorce and
child custody mediation and the role of "traditional neutrals" in that context, who
may be mining the courts' experience with mediation in order to develop innovative
and tailored hybrid procedures.
165 Id. at 146.
166 Id. (noting Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee "responded with a counterproposal, the contents of
which, consistent with the requirement of the mediation order that the court not be informed of the
proceedings before the mediator" were not disclosed to court).
167 id.
168 Id.
9 Id. at 146, 148 (noting objective of both motions was to propose competing plans). One was a motion
"For Order Terminating or Modifying Exclusivity Period to Permit Filing of Alternative Reorganization
Plan," and the second was a motion "To Declare Mediation Impasse." Id. at 144-45.
170 d. at 146 (claiming entitlement to level playing field in mediation plan).
17 'd at 148.
I72 d. at 148-49 (finding no cause to doubt assessment of mediator since all parties agreed to both
mediation and selection of mediator).
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V. EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION
For many years, divorce and child custody mediation was viewed as the one
area of court-connected mediation that could be characterized as primarily-though
not exclusively-elicitive or facilitative. 173 Particularly in custody matters, it made
so much sense that the parents would want to play the primary role in determining
how to care for and support their children after a divorce-and it made so much
sense that the courts would want to support parents in this preference.17 4 Research
has affirmed that divorce and child custody mediation results in higher rates of
compliance, fewer returns to the courts with post-divorce disputes, and more
significant relationships between children and both of their parents.
175
Recently, however, a few researchers 176 and well-respected mediation advocates
and leaders' 77 have begun to highlight concerns and challenges for court-connected
divorce and child custody mediation. It appears that the process has evolved into
something that is not as consensual as it once was. 178 Largely, this evolution is due
173See Nancy A. Welsh, Reconciling Self-Determination, Coercion, and Settlement in Court-Connected
Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY: MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 420 (Folberg,
et. al eds., 2004) [hereinafter Welsh, Reconciling Self-Determination]. But see Isolina Ricci, Court-Based
Mandatory Mediation: Special Considerations, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY: MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 397 (Folberg, et. al eds., 2004) (describing "recommending" model of
mediation in California, which made divorce and child custody mediation mandatory in 198 1).
1
74See Ann L. Milne, Mediation and Domestic Abuse, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 304 (Folberg, et al. eds., 2004).
175See Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research: Some Answers and Questions, 34 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 373, 377 (1996) (stating mediation agreements have higher rate of compliance than
adversarial process agreements); Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for
the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 28 (2004) [hereinafter Kelly, Family Mediation] ("Mediation has
given evidence of its power to settle complex, highly emotional disputes and reach agreements that are
generally durable."); Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the
End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV 371, 373-74 (2009) (discussing advantages of mediation
such as quick settlement, agreement satisfaction, and improved family relationships); see also Ralph A.
Peeples et al., It's the Conflict, Stupid: An Empirical Study of Factors that Inhibit Successful Mediation in
High-Conflict Custody Cases, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 505, 528 (2008) (finding agreements reached
through mediation were more stable than court orders).
176See Salem, supra note 175, at 374 (citing CONNIE J. BECK & BRUCE DENNIS SALES, FAMILY
MEDIATION: FACTS, MYTHS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (2001)) (noting limited research that has been done
on family mediation); see also Connie J. Beck et al., Research on the Impact of Family Mediation, in
DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 447 (Jay Folberg, et. al eds.,
2004).
177 See Hon. Leonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Commission Report: A California Perspective, 27
PACE L. REV. 627, 628, 656 (2007) (advocating mediation for New York while identifying challenges in
California, including one hour mediations as result of resource and funding issues); Kelly, Family Mediation,
supra note 175, at 29 (acknowledging reduced time for mediation); Salem, supra note 175, at 385-86, 385 n.
1 (discussing differing methods of alternative dispute resolution in family setting employed by multiple
jurisdictions in different regions and suggesting adaptation of type of mediation used based on context);
Donald T. Saposnek, Commentary: The Future of the History of Family Mediation Research, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 37 (2004) (response to article by Joan Kelly articulating mediation "works, but not quite as
comprehensively as... [was] hoped"). But see Steve Baron, A Response to Peter Salem's Article, 48 FAM.
CT. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Hugh Mclsaac, A Response to Peter Salem's Article, 48 FAM. CT. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
178 Or perhaps simply appeared to be. See Salem, supra note 175, at 378 (noting outside findings
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to the phenomenon of increasing and more difficult caseloads, static or reduced
hiring of mediators, static or reduced court funding, and no reduction in the public's
or courts' expectations for the prompt disposition of cases. 79
The divorce and child custody mediation that produced such positive results in
the 1980s took time-perhaps five to six hours per case-with each mediation
session lasting a couple of hours. Increasingly, due to increased caseloads and
static hiring, divorce and child custody mediations must be completed in an hour.'80
Inevitably, in order to achieve settlement, mediators are tempted to adopt more
evaluative, directive and even coercive approaches.' 18 There is a possibility that
these settlements still reflect the parents' "self-determination," but that seems
unlikely.
In addition, the people being served by divorce and child custody mediation
may be becoming more difficult-and expensive-for courts to handle.'
82
Throughout the country, courts note the increase of pro se litigants. 183 More parties
require translation services. 184 There is also more reporting of domestic abuse, child
abuse, and substance abuse in divorce and child custody matters.1
85
Finally, though, mediation is no longer the only process besides traditional
litigation that family courts can provide. This is especially true for disputing
parents who want, or can benefit from, the opportunity to be directly involved in the
reorganization of their family but who also need help with this profoundly
important change. In some courts, 186 caring and pragmatic court administrators,
sugesting mediators are pushing settlement rather than providing options).
See id. at 377 (discussing "question as to whether court-connected mediation continues to deliver on the
promise of family self-determination").
180 See id. at 379 (referencing opinion that insufficient time is being offered for parents to effectively
resolve differences) (citation omitted); see also Edwards, supra note 177, at 650 ("Some mediation services
can only offer the parents an hour or even less to resolve their differences."); Kelly, Family Mediation, supra
note 175, at 29 (suggesting client dissatisfaction with mediation might "reflect[ ] a more rushed or coercive
mediation process").
'8' See Salem, supra note 175, at 378-79 (discussing directive and evaluative approaches for settlements in
divorce and child custody cases to deal with timing issues); see also Welsh, Reconciling Self-Determination,
supra note 173, at 427-34 (describing Florida case of Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine).
182 See Salem, supra note 175, at 381-82 (acknowledging families are exposed to increased financial
burdens when they are required to participate in unneeded mediation).
183 Kimberlianne Podlas, Broadcast Litigiousness: Syndi-Court's Construction of Legal Consciousness, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 465, 498 (2005) (acknowledging increasing number of pro se litigants).
1" See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 35 (2007) (noting 17% increase in number of court events requiring interpreters across nation
from 2006 to 2007).
185 See Saposnek, supra note 177, at 38 (discussing increase in serious problems reported during divorce
cases from 1980s to present day). Importantly, it is not clear whether the actual incidence of these problems
is increasing, whether people are more willing to admit to dealing with such issues, or whether court
personnel are more likely to detect issues of abuse now than previously. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE COURTS, RESEARCH UPDATE: DIFFICULT CASES IN
CALIFORNIA COURT-BASED CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION 2 (2003) (reporting lack of systematic method
used to collect statistical information regarding domestic violence and drug abuse in divorce mediation).
186 See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 185, at 9 n.3 (stating only 35% of California
family courts provide ADR options besides mediation). It is important to note that these alternatives are not
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counselors, and judges have been able to develop new alternatives that explicitly
bridge the divide between elicitive/facilitative/consensual approaches in mediation
on the one hand and evaluative/directive/adjudicative procedures approaches on the
other. Examples include:
* Conflict resolution conference-a "confidential dispute resolution
process [that] ...is more directive than mediation, and may include
information gathering and recommendations on the part of the family
relations counselor" 1
87
e Non-confidential dispute resolution and assessment-a
"hybrid process that includes negotiation and encourages agreements
but, if necessary, includes assessment, child interviews, collateral
information gathering and recommendations to the court"'
88
e Early neutral evaluation-a "confidential abbreviated process in
which parties, accompanied by lawyers if represented, present their
case to two evaluators who provide an early indication of their likely
recommendation with the caveat that such recommendations are based
on parties' ability to verify their claims and allegations"' 89
* Collaborative law-"an interest based negotiation approach to
lawyer-assisted settlement negotiations that frequently incorporates
mental health and financial professionals" as well as direct party
participation in settlement negotiations and in which "lawyers
withdraw if the case does not settle and proceeds to trial" 90 ; and
available in all courts. For a variety of reasons, many courts can offer only mediation as an alternative. My
thanks to Peter Salem for this clarification.
187 Salem, supra note 175, at 385 n.1; see Peter Salem et al., Triaging Family Court Services: The
Connecticut Judicial Branch's Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 753 (2006) (describing
conflict resolution conference as "eight-week confidential service that blends the negotiation and mediation
processes" in which no findings or recommendations are revealed by counselors if agreement is not
reached).
188 Salem, supra note 175, at 386 n.1 (citing Clarence Cramer, personal communication July 31, 2008).
This hybrid, though very intriguing, has recently been discontinued. See E-mail from Peter Salem to Nancy
Welsh (Sept. 27, 2009) (on file with author). The reasons for such discontinuance are unclear.
189 Salem, supra note 175, at 386 n.1; see Daniel Forman, Improving Asylum-Seeker Credibility
Determinations: Introducing Appropriate Dispute Resolution Techniques into the Process, 16 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 234 (2008) (stating neutral evaluators may also assist in "developing a discovery
schedule, streamlining issues for trial, or planning other settlement events"); Yvonne Pearson et al., Early
Neutral Evaluation: Applications to Custody and Parenting Time Cases Program Development and
Implementation in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 672, 673 (2006) (describing Early
Neutral Evaluation (ENE) as "2- to 3-hour" session in which each side, represented by its own attorney,
present its case to two neutral evaluators, "one male and one female," who ask each side questions and give
feedback to parties before attempting settlement negotiations); Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer,
Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detrained Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered
Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 13, 20 (2006) (discussing helping parties reach settlement or
preparing parties for trial based on strengths and weaknesses of each side's case as responsibilities of ENE
evaluators).
190 Salem, supra note 175, at 386 n. 1; see Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Toolfor the Lawyer's
Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 120-21 (2009) (describing contractual relationship among parties
and lawyers in which attorneys agree to withdraw should case not settle and parties agree to "negotiat[e] in
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* Cooperative negotiation agreements or cooperative law-"lawyer-
assisted settlement negotiations that typically incorporate voluntary
information sharing, interest based negotiation, direct involvement of
clients, confidential negotiations, children's best interest as an essential
ingredient and disincentives (not including withdrawal of counsel) to
litigation."
, 19 1,192
These procedures involve custody investigators, court staff, lawyers-the
"traditional neutrals" and professionals who may have felt (or have actually been)
supplanted by mediators. The "traditional neutrals" did not go away. They
regrouped, learned new approaches and skills, and adapted to respond to both
mediation's challenge and the needs of the many parties still turning to the courts
for help.
Some innovative family courts seem to be adopting something akin to the
multi-door courthouse. For example, some courts that formerly required all
divorcing parties to attempt mediation before they could proceed to other, more
intrusive and adjudicative procedures, now require divorcing parties to engage in an
interactive process with a trained court services counselor. Together, the parties
and the counselor use a research-based screening and assessment instrument,
supplemented by the counselor's clinical judgment, to determine the most
appropriate procedure. 193 This is called the "triage" model of delivering court
services, as contrasted with the "tiered" service model. 1
94
It may seem that all of this innovation represents a repudiation and rejection of
mediation. It is not. Rather, it represents a recognition that mediation is not, cannot
good faith, voluntarily disclos[e] information, maintain[ ] confidentiality ... and refrain[ ] from litigative
motions"); John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation,
Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 282-83
(2004) (elaborating upon process in which both sides enjoy strong advocacy while striving for collaboration
through negotiation with help of coaches and specialists who can educate and aid parties during negotiation);
see also MACFARLANE, supra note 60, at 89 (positing nature of collaborative law retainer agreement shifts
attorneys' strategy and focus by taking option of litigation off of table); Lande, supra note 65, at 626-28
(citing "disqualification agreement" as lynchpin of increasingly popular ADR method).
191 Salem, supra note 175, at 386; see Lande, supra note 65, at 632 n. 62 ("Cooperative Law is a process
that includes the features of CL other than the disqualification agreement.").
192 Other more innovative procedures that do not quite bridge this divide include interdisciplinary
arbitration panels, psycho-educational programs, and parenting coordination. Salem, supra note 175, at 371.
193 See id at 380 ("In a triage system, parents may complete an initial screen and/or participate in an
interview, and agency representatives then help identify the service they believe will best meet the needs of
the family. The determination of services may be based on a combination of pre-determined criteria, clinical
judgment and feedback from parents .... "); Salem et al., supra note 187, at 757-64 (2007) (outlining
Connecticut's Family Civil Intake Screen and describing empirical bases and how counselors exercise
clinical judgment in process); see also Nancy A. Welsh, The Future of Mediation: Court-Connected
Mediation in the U.S. and the Netherlands Compared, I FORUM VOOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 19, 21
(2007) [hereinafter Welsh, Future of Mediation] (noting some "Dutch judges in the pilot sites ... distributed
a 'self test' to all parties to encourage them to consider whether mediation might be appropriate for their
case.").
194 See Salem, supra note 175, at 371-372 (explaining arguments in favor and against triage model in
comparison to tiered model).
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be, and never should have been expected to be, the cure-all for every ill. Like most
organisms, mediation requires structural protection in order to achieve its
potential-e.g., sufficient time for deliberation; mediators who are not afraid of the
consequences that may be visited upon them if mediating parties refuse to settle;
authority to refuse service to parties who have demonstrated their inability or
unwillingness to benefit from participation in the process; and complementary
services to which mediators may refer.
Mediation blazed the way in creating an alternative to traditional litigation in
the family courts, but it has now been joined by other procedures, customized to
respond to the characteristics and circumstances of those who must use them 95 in
order to receive judicial permission to divorce and parent their children.1 96 In at
least some pioneering courts, there are now several paths to the resolution of
divorce and child custody matters, hopefully with all processes sharing a
commitment to the provision of an experience of justice.
197
VI. LESSONS FOR BANKRUPTCY MEDIATION
There is no doubt that mediation offers unique advantages for the resolution of
disputes-the ability to deal with all of the issues, not just those that come within
the jurisdiction of a particular court; the opportunity to exploit the parties'
knowledge and skills, rather than relying exclusively on the lawyers, to develop
creative, customized solutions; the opportunity to experience those moments of
grace when people suddenly see each other and understand something about each
other and their situation that they did not understand before.
And yet, the "fit" between mediation-especially the facilitative, elicitive, and
transformative models of mediation-and the mass processing of cases in civil
litigation has often been an uneasy one. Perhaps this model of mediation has been
expected to do too much. The recent emergence of new, hybrid processes in the
195 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) ("The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to
the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.").
196 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (requiring access to courts for indigent parties
because states have monopoly on ability to adjust this fundamental human relationship). These procedures
also may reflect judicial acknowledgement of the need to adapt to "the exigencies of the circumstances" that
burden courts. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (explaining that exigencies in enemy
combatant proceedings might allow "[h]earsay, for example .... to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government").
197 See Brazil, supra note 131, at I (noting importance "for judges to think systematically and carefully"
regarding their role in settlement negotiation and providing pros and cons of different formats for settlement
conferences); Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury
Trial, 738 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 20-21 (2004) (discussing failure of "lawyers, courts, and policy makers" to
take sufficient notice of mandatory arbitration's denial of jury trial to claimants); Welsh, Future of
Mediation, supra note 193, at 22 (explaining that "the people and government of The Netherlands seem to
support the legitimacy of multiple and different, freely-chosen paths to justice . . . [including] dispute
resolution paths"); see also Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 861 ("The experience of justice should
not be set aside as some 'sweet old fashioned notion' that has outlived its usefulness to modem, settlement-
directed civil litigation. Instead, mediation ... should be allowed to demonstrate that justice can and should
have everything to do with the 'world of bargaining'....").
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divorce and child custody area that use the knowledge, expertise, and adjudicative
authority of "traditional neutrals" while also incorporating some of mediation's
elements-aspects of self-determination, the opportunity for respectful but less
formal voice and consideration, the neutral's skillful facilitation of dialogue and
mutual consideration between the parties-suggests that bankruptcy judges, repeat
players, and policy makers should look at all of their options and their current
personnel before settling exclusively upon mediation and mediators as 'the brand
new thing' and the only meaningful 'alternative' to traditional litigation.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine in detail the efficacy of
potential hybrids in the bankruptcy context. Based on the experience of divorce and
child custody mediation, however, a few possibilities come to mind. Currently,
trustees administer debtors' estates in chapter 7 matters but assume this role in
chapter 11 matters only in extreme situations in which creditors have completely
lost confidence in the honesty or competence of debtors-in-possession.1 98 Perhaps
trustees could play a useful, potentially less intrusive role before situations have
become so dire. The procedure of non-confidential dispute resolution and
assessment, for example, suggests the possibility that trustees could step in to
facilitate negotiations between the debtor and worried creditors, conduct an
assessment, interview employees and customers, gather other information, and
ultimately make a recommendation to the court before wresting control from the
debtor-in-possession. Examiners might be empowered to begin offering a
confidential, truncated process in which representatives of the debtor and creditors
present their case to two examiners who then provide a tentative recommendation,
recognizing that this recommendation is based on the debtor's and creditors' ability
to substantiate their claims and defenses. Examiners might even follow this
procedure with an opportunity for facilitated negotiation.199 Of course, bankruptcy
courts would need to ensure that trustees and examiners have sufficient training to
play any such new roles and receive appropriate compensation. This presents an
obvious challenge, particularly at a time of reduced resources. Outside the courts,
some bankruptcy lawyers may wish to explore the application of collaborative or
cooperative law to the negotiation of reorganization plans.
These broad brush ideas only begin to suggest the ways in which the divorce
and child custody area might offer intriguing potential models that participants in
the bankruptcy field may wish to investigate. Obviously, there are significant
differences between family law and bankruptcy law. These differences need to be
198 See Edward Janger & Jeff Ferriell, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 143, 151 (2d ed. 2007) (There is no
trustee in chapter II reorganization cases. Instead, the debtor's estate is administered by the debtor-in-
possession, who has all of the same rights, powers, and duties of a trustee. A trustee is appointed only for
cause, which includes "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement" of the debtor or its assets,
or if the court determines that the appointment of a trustee is "in the interest of creditors"); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006) (allowing court to order trustee to be appointed to monitor fraud and
mismanagement if it is in best interest of estate and creditors).
199 See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1489-90 (1994) (articulating purpose of early neutral evaluation process is to encourage
both parties to evaluate strength of case, identify areas in dispute, and encourage negotiations).
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acknowledged, and, even if a divorce and child custody hybrid looks sufficiently
promising to merit investigation and adoption, adaptations almost certainly will be
required. 200 This Article is meant only to stimulate curiosity and encourage further
and deeper consideration of the possibilities.
CONCLUSION
Why should we care about the confusing and conflicting uses of mediation that
have surfaced in bankruptcy matters? If the process settles case, why mess with it?
The response to this question is two-fold. First and simply, mediation should mean
something. People entering into the process should know what to expect, how the
mediator will behave toward them, and whether use of their statements and
behaviors will be protected by confidentiality or the mediation privilege. Multiple
paths to resolution permit parties to choose the path most appropriate to their needs
and preferences.201
Further, it is only if mediation and mediators have a recognized (and thus
valued) function and form that they can play their role and permit other processes
and actors to play theirs. Ultimately, the mediation process is then more likely to
receive the support it needs in order to fulfill its promise and provide an experience
of justice for all of those who participate in it.
Many years ago, Owen Fiss,20 2 Tina Grillo 20 3 and Richard Delgado204 offered
serious critiques of settlement in general and mediation in particular. For reasons
that now seem almost sweetly naive, mediation advocates and program designers
thought their (or more accurately, our) good intentions would inoculate mediation
from the challenges presented by reality. As a result, some of the fears expressed
by Fiss, Grillo and Delgado have been realized. Today, if mediation advocates in
the bankruptcy context are willing to learn from others' her/history, they can choose
to structure the use of bankruptcy mediation more protectively. Hubris is said to
200 For example, it would be very important to learn why non-confidential dispute resolution and
assessment has been discontinued recently. That information could lead to rejection of this model-or
improvement upon it. See Riskin, Understanding Mediators, supra note 37, at 11 (emphasizing mediation
techniques cannot be generalized because every dispute or transaction is different and varies greatly within
each area of law).
201 See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 76, at 65-66 (noting parties in legal disputes can resolve conflict
through negotiation, mediation, trial arbitration, and various other options).
202 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing ADR should not be allowed
because parties are often coerced to settle and absence of judicial involvement raises various concerns); see
also Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
203 Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1045, 1549-50
(1991) (opposing mandatory family mediation because it requires parties to interact in forced setting, women
often feel obliged to maintain connection with ex-partner during process, and it is potentially destructive
because parties were once involved in intimate relationship).
204 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1387-88, 1391 (1985) (stating ADR does little to counter
historical and subconscious prejudice, and arguing judicial system should be used to encourage fairness and
deter prejudice because such systems are formal, subject to more control, and can reduce prejudice).
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characterize every new generation. Honestly, hubris characterizes every generation,
whether young or old. The real question is whether, despite our hubris, we are
willing to listen and learn from each other.
